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Abstract 
The recent persistent and synchronised deterioration in the euro zone had severe consequences for the euro community, the 
effects of which have been felt by the global community. This study proved that sovereign rating contagion existed between euro 
countries during the two recent windows of crises, namely the Lehman and sovereign debt crisis. Compelling evidence from the 
analysis provided a clear indication of contagion during the two periods of crisis. Results indicated a higher vulnerability to 
shocks and a higher degree of connection during the windows of crises than during the tranquil periods. Notable was that the 
European Union (EU) sovereign debt crisis experienced a more pronounced degree of contagion than the Lehman crisis period 
did. During the sovereign debt crisis window, a dominant theme was the highly integrated connection between the Portugal, Italy, 
Greece and Spain (PIGS) group of countries.  
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1. Introduction 
The persistent and synchronised deterioration of the economic health in the euro countries since the global 
financial crisis has had far reaching economic and social consequences that will create a drag on the economic 
growth of these nations for generations to come (Stracca 2013:5[1]; Caporin et al. 2012:2[2]; Gentile and Giordano 
2012:1[3]). Contagion is not a new phenomenon. In his speech on sovereign contagion in Europe, European Central 
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Bank (ECB) board member Gonzalez-Paramo (2011:1[4]) points out that reference to contagion were made as early 
as 1871 by Walter Bagehot in the ‘Lombard Street’ speech around the panic caused by the failure of Overend, 
Gurney and Co in 1866.  
According to Constancio (2012:110 [5]), the banking crisis that was triggered in August 2007 reached a climax in 
September 2008 when Lehman defaulted. This culminated in a sovereign crisis in the spring of 2010. The sovereign 
crisis was triggered by the announcement of a referendum in Greece in November 2010, following the decision to 
consider a rescue program at an EU summit the previous week (Gonzalez-Paramo 2011:1[4]).   Although Germany 
and France normalised soon after the announcement, this triggered the start of a persistent decline in Italian and 
Spanish sovereign debt. In addition to the weakening in government bond spreads, a synchronised deterioration in 
sovereign ratings of the euro zone as well as numerous large bank and corporate rating downgrades ensued.  Aside 
from the dislocation experienced in the euro zone during the sovereign debt crisis, it should be noted that the 
integration effect of the EU increases the interconnectedness and therefore exacerbates the negative effects of the 
instability caused by the Greek rescue package. This integration effect has been the subject of numerous studies 
(Bekaert et al. 2010:1[6]; Beber et al. 2009:1[7]; Gomez-Puig 2008:455[8]; Borensztein et al. 2007:1[9]; Rowland 
and Torres 2004:3[10]; Amira 2004:1[11]).   
The synchronised decline in the health of sovereigns in the euro zone and the deterioration of the global economy 
prompts a number of important questions. What is the nature of the connection between euro countries and their 
sovereign ratings? Does this relationship change during periods of crisis? This research investigates the presence 
and directionality of contagion between countries sovereign credit ratings in the euro zone.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows, in section two the literature review will be discussed, in 
section three the data and method will be discussed briefly, section four present the empirical findings and the 
discussion of the results and section five conclude this paper. 
2. Literature review 
Gentile and Giordano (2012:8[3]) describe “contagion” as “the amount of co-movement among asset prices 
which exceeds what is explained by fundamentals”. These authors argue that a degree of extreme connection or 
asymmetry that goes beyond interdependencies must be present in order for contagion to be present. 
Research on contagion range from conditional correlation to contagion of bond spreads, equity market stock 
returns, differences in interest rates, monetary policy and currency market variance (Gentile and Giordano 
2012:8[3]; Andenmatten and Brill 2011:1[12]; Saghaian 2010:1[13]; Pontines and Siregar 2007:1[14]; Campbell et 
al. 2006:2[15]; Suleimann 2003:1[16]; Forbes and Rigobon 2002:2225[17]; Butler and Joaqin 2002:981[18]; Ang 
and Chen 2002:444[19]; Longin and Solnik 2001:4[20]; and Favero and Giavazzi 2000:3[21}, Beirne and Gieck 
(2012:1[22]).  
A wide range of empirical techniques has been used to quantify correlation and contagion. Dungey et al. 
(2004:4[23]) note that tools to measure contagion range from correlation and covariance analysis undertaken by, for 
example, Forbes and Rigobon (2002:2225[17]) to probability models by, for example, Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz (1995:250[24]) to latent factor structure by Dungey and Martin (2001:2[25]), principle components by 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999:474[26]), multiple equilibria and finally VAR.   
Vector Autoregression (VAR) cointegration and VECM / Granger causality tests have been used to measure 
contagion in numerous studies. Beirne and Gieck (2012:1[22]) use a global VAR to measure interdependence and 
contagion across bonds, stocks and currencies for over 60 economies during periods of crisis. These authors’ 
analysis reveals that shocks to equity markets typically originate in the US and that bond market shocks tend to 
originate in the euro zone. Gentile and Giordano (2012:7[3]) use cointegration and VECM / Granger causality tests 
to measure the existence and direction of contagion in European countries during the Lehman default and sovereign 
debt crisis. Gentile and Giordano (2012:7[3]) use sovereign bond spreads and stock returns as a country risk 
indicator. Andenmatten and Brill (2011:1[12]) use a bi-variate test to prove contagion in emerging and industrialised 
countries using credit default swap (CDS) spreads during the Greek debt crisis of 2009. Saghaian (2010:1[13]) uses 
Granger causality to create contemporaneous contagion links between agriculture and energy markets within the 
commodity sector. Suleimann (2003:1[16]) uses VAR to measure contagion in technology stock prices between 
Europe and the United States. Pontines and Siregar (2007:1[14]) use Markov Switching and VAR to measure 
contagion in East Asian markets using stock exchange returns during periods of turbulence. Favero and Giavazzi 
(2000:3[21]) use VAR to test contagion using money market spreads across European Monetary Union countries. 
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Baig and Goldfajn (1999:168[28]) use dummy variables in VAR and correlation models to prove contagion during 
the East Asian crisis. Deaton and Miller (1995:10) use VAR to connect the relationship between commodity prices 
and the GDP growth of African countries. In this paper, the Gentile and Giordano (2012:8[3]) approach will be 
adapted by measuring the presence of contagion transmitted by sovereign ratings during windows of distress and 
tranquility. 
While research measuring contagion between countries exists, the variables that are included in the analysis do 
not include a composite variable that captures a multi-dimensional view of the economy such as sovereign ratings. 
The literature reviewed above indicates that contagion research is typically limited to variables such as equity prices 
and bond spreads.  This narrow focus on isolated variables fails to provide a composite connection between cross-
country macroeconomics.  
Sovereign ratings use a composite of variables and therefore provide a broad-based indicator of macroeconomic 
health. Various potential predictive variables that could provoke a sovereign default event through the economic 
cycle range from political, fiscal and monetary to those exogenous to the general macro economy.  The type and 
intensity of variables work together through the cycle to contribute to a specific type of crisis, ranging from local to 
external debt, interest rate, currency and financial crises. A sovereign rating default is a common trigger that results 
from deterioration in the predictive factors and gives rise to a spillover event that could culminate in contagion 
(Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli 2010:1[29], Reinhart and Rogoff 2009:1[30]; Kindleberger and Aliber 
2005:1[31]; Manasse and Roubini 2005:4[32]; Rowland and Torres 2004:3[10]; Manasse, Roubini and 
Schimmelpfennig 2003:4[33]; Mellios and Paget-Blanc 2003:1[34]; and Reinhart 2002a:2[35]).  
3. Data and methodology 
The model tests for contagion based on the connection between sovereign ratings in eight countries, namely 
France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Spain. The model uses S&P sovereign ratings 
recorded on a monthly basis between 2004 and 2013. This period of analysis is used because it covers important 
periods of distress for the euro area, characterised by trigger default events for the euro area.  
Constancio (2012:110[5]) and Caporin et al. (2012:3[2]) maintains that a contagious event cannot occur in the 
absence of a shock, a large shock should occur. Gentile and Giordano (2012:8]3]) identify contagion windows for 
the euro-contagion analysis based on the Lehman default and sovereign debt crisis.  Other researchers using similar 
windows include studies by Andenmatten and Brill (2011:1[27]), Fofana and Seyte (2012:1[12]) and Caballero, 
Farhi and Gourinchas (2008:1[27]). The Argentine crisis or the Asian crisis were not possible to model since the 
sovereign ratings of the euro countries displayed very little movement in their ratings.  The windows for this study 
are the tranquil period between 2004 and 2008, the credit crisis of 2007 triggered by the Lehman default and the 
euro zone sovereign debt crisis triggered by the Greek sovereign debt restructure in December 2010.  
The sovereign credit ratings are mapped to a 21-point scale. This is based on an adaptation of the mapping used 
by Reinhart (2002b:10[37]), Rowland (2004:26[38]), and Cantor and Packer (1996:78[39]) whereby  a linear 
transformation is used to assign numerical values to credit ratings from highest to lowest credit rating. Non-linear 
transformations were avoided since non-linear transformation found not materially different results (Afonso, Gomes 
and Rother (2007:23[40]).   
The model followed a three-step approach, similar to that used by Beirne and Gieck (2012:1[22]), Gentile and 
Giordano (2012:8[3]), and Baig and Goldfajn (1999:168[28]). Each step compared results between periods of 
tranquillity and periods of distress. The first step involved analysis of long run equilibrium relations using bi-variate 
dynamic cointegration. The second step applied Granger causality tests to measure the number of short run relations 
that existed between countries during each period of time. Lastly, the innovation accounting technique, variance 
decomposition was applied. Results from each of the three steps were compared for each window of time to evaluate 
the prevalence and nature of sovereign rating contagion in the Euro area; therefore determining whether the 
connection between countries was higher or asymmetrical during crisis periods; exceeding the movement caused by 
fundamentals.     
4. Empirical findings and discussion of results 
Stationarity testing with the Augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillips Peron tests confirmed that all the series were 
I(1).  The optimal lag length, using the Schwartz information criterion (SC) and Hannan-Quin criterion (HQ), was 
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one. Using a lag of one period, the Johansen’s cointegration test was applied to determine pairwise long-run 
relations during each time window.  
4.1. Pinpointing contagion windows using pairwise cointegration 
Pairwise cointegration test results are recorded for the tranquil window between May 2004 and August 2008. The 
cointegration tests measure the number of long run relations that exist between sovereign ratings of countries. The 
long run measure is particularly pertinent since sovereign ratings are expected to have a stronger long-run 
relationship than a short-run relationship. Studies that use variables that respond more rapidly to shocks, on the 
contrary, such as, for example, equity or bond prices, are likely to display more short-run relations than long-run.  
Table 1 indicates four long run relations, mainly involving Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain (PIGS) and Hungary. 
The relatively higher number of PIGS relationships indicate a higher level of integration during tranquil times and a 
fundamental connection. This connection becomes asymmetrical during periods of distress as is borne out by a 
materially higher number of cointegrating relations during the contagion windows displayed in Table 2 and 3. 
France does not enter into the cointegrating equation due to this country’s strong fundamentals and therefore a high 
credit rating during the tranquil period.  
Table 1: Cointegration during tranquil window: May 2004 – August 2008  
 France  Greece  Hungary  Ireland  Italy  Poland  Portugal  Spain  Total  
France          
Greece          
Hungary   0        
Ireland           
Italy   1 1       
Poland   0   0     
Portugal   1 0  0     
Spain    0  0  1   
Total          4 
Source: Eviews estimates 
 
The Lehman and sovereign debt contagion windows contain cointegration results in Table 2 and 3 respectively 
that reflect seven and twelve cointegrating relations respectively. This is far higher than the four relations reflected 
in the tranquil window.  
The cointegration results in Table 2 and 3 strongly support the idea that contagion involves externalities and is 
“distinct because it reflects a market failure and a dangerously amplified transmission of instability” (Gonzalez-
Paramo 2011:1[4]). Moreover, the results support Constancio’s (2012:110[5]) view that the spread of instability is 
abnormal and amplified, that it goes beyond the bounds of normality. These results support the findings by Gentile 
and Giordano (2012:1[3]) that prove the existence of contagion in the euro countries during the Lehman and 
sovereign debt crises. Moreover, the results are congruent with those by Andenmatten and Brill (2011:1[12]) and 
Gray (2009:1[41]), both of whom prove contagion using bond spreads and equity prices during the recent global 
financial crisis. This study expands upon the contagion results of previous euro studies by proving that contagion 
can be expanded to sovereign credit ratings.  
The PIGS countries feature sharply during both contagion windows, with Greece reflecting more than double the 
number of cointegrating relations during the Lehman window as compared to the tranquil period. The leading 
position that Greece takes is not surprising given the deterioration of Greece’s economy during this period. France 
features more significantly during the euro debt crisis window, indicating a higher degree of integration with other 
euro countries during the sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, the fundamentals of France and the health of its banks 
were seriously compromised by the exposure of this country to the sovereign debt problems being experienced by 
the other euro countries.  
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Table 2: Cointegration during the Lehman contagion window: September 2008 – December 2009  
 France  Greece  Hungary  Ireland  Italy  Poland  Portugal  Spain  Total  
France          
Greece          
Hungary   1        
Ireland   1 1       
Italy           
Poland           
Portugal   1 1       
Spain   1 1       
Total          7 
Source: Eviews estimates 
 
The more meaningful cointegration results are indicated by a higher number of cointegrating relations during the 
sovereign debt crisis. This indicates a more widespread contagion effect in the number of countries involved, and 
also involves the downgrade of France, a significant event. The close proximity of these two windows of contagion 
and the connection with a banking panic begs the question of how long the negative effects of the protracted 
downturn might last.  
Table 3: Cointegration during the sovereign debt contagion window: December 2010 – January 2013 
 France  Greece  Hungary  Ireland  Italy  Poland  Portugal  Spain  Total  
France    1 1  1   
Greece    1 1  1   
Hungary        1 1  
Ireland      1  1   
Italy           
Poland           
Portugal      1   1  
Spain           
Total          12 
Source: Eviews estimates 
 
In summary, the results indicating the abnormally high presence of long run relations in the contagion windows 
relative to the tranquil window are supportive of the initial notion that the scale and reach of the recent crises has 
created an externalised impact that caused much higher connectivity or contagion during the crisis periods than 
during tranquil periods. Moreover, it is notable that this high degree of contagion is relevant during a period that 
coincides with a banking crisis. The banking crisis that was triggered during the Lehman window continued during 
the euro debt crisis window because many euro banks were downgraded due to their exposures to sovereign debt 
issued by troubled countries. These results support findings by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008:1[30]) and Bernanke and 
Lown (1991:206[42]) that a banking panic is typically associated with a more disorderly and protracted disturbance.  
This cross-market and cross-border effect makes the transmission effect of shocks complex and poses a seriously 
multifaceted problem for policy makers. According to Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-Hermosillo and Martin (2011:192), a 
complex problem that this situation presents is that the weight of each contagion channel will vary and the impact of 
policy response will not be linear. Policy makers will therefore need to develop a combination of micro-structure 
and country-specific policies while also contributing to the macro, cross-jurisdictional measures (Dungey et al. 
2011:192). Co-ordinated policy response by countries during the crisis as well as the active ECB and US FED 
stimulus packages will have contributed to an increased level of integration and co-movement between the countries 
during this period.  
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4.2. Leaders and followers defined by Granger causality results  
Granger causality tests were applied to each of the three windows. The previous section presented evidence of 
contagion in the euro area, based on cointegration tests that indicated long run relations between countries during 
each window. The results presented in this section, by contrast, provide an indication of the short run relations that 
exist between the countries during each time period. Short run relations are identified as those countries that reject 
the null hypothesis at a 95 percent confidence interval.  
 
Gentile and Giordano (2012:9[3]) maintain that the Granger causality tests indicate which variables, in our case 
country sovereign ratings, take on a leader and a follower role. Leaders will be those countries that shape the 
transmission of short run relations to other sovereign ratings.  Follower countries are those that are vulnerable or 
receptive to innovations or shocks in sovereign ratings.  
 
During the first window, that is the tranquil window between 2004 and 2008, in Table 4, only three short run 
relations are evident. During this window, Hungary causes Italy, Italy causes Poland and Spain causes Portugal. 
Hungary, Italy and Spain therefore take on leading roles during this period and Italy, Poland and Portugal are 
respective followers. These follower countries indicate their growth vulnerability. These results are consistent with 
findings from Gentile and Giordano (2012:32[3]).   
Table 4: Granger results for the tranquil window 
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic P-
HUNGARY does not Granger Cause 
ITALY  16.091 *0.000 
ITALY does not Granger Cause POLAND  4.398 *0.018 
SPAIN does not Granger Cause 
PORTUGAL  3.281 *0.047 
*Reject null hypothesis at 95% confidence level 
Source: Eviews estimates 
 
The Lehman window of contagion in Table 5 indicates five short-run relations between the countries. During this 
period, Hungary, Portugal and Spain take on lead roles. Ireland is a follower country in most of these relations. This 
follower status shows that Ireland was particularly vulnerable during this period. This vulnerability is consistent 
with the distress that this country experienced when Ireland negotiated economic support of 85 billion euros from 
the EU and IMF (EU 2012:1).  According to the EU (2012:1), this crisis was precipitated by a housing bubble that 
was fueled by risky lending, growing public spending and a blanket guarantee that the government issued to protect 
distressed banks. These fueling factors caused the sovereign debt of Ireland to reach 9 percent, which caused Ireland 
to be excluded from the global bond market. Ireland was rescued by the EU and IMF package and also by an 
agreement by EU members to restructure interest and extend maturity of EU loans (EU 2012:1). Portugal and Spain 
also took on follower positions indicating a nascent trend of growing debt that would manifest during the sovereign 
debt crisis. The Granger results can be seen in the table below.  
Table 5: Granger results for Lehman contagion window 
 Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic P-value.  
 HUNGARY does not Granger Cause IRELAND  6.352 *0.019 
 HUNGARY does not Granger Cause PORTUGAL  4.500 *0.044 
 HUNGARY does not Granger Cause SPAIN  4.500 *0.044 
 PORTUGAL does not Granger Cause IRELAND  7.071 *0.014 
 SPAIN does not Granger Cause IRELAND  7.071 *0.014 
* Reject Null Hypothesis at 95% level 
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Source: Eviews estimates  
 
The sovereign debt window of contagion indicates seven short-run relations. During this window, the effects of 
the downgrade of France by S&P in January 2012 are clear as France becomes a follower in Table 6 (Adam and 
Deen 2013:1). In this table, Hungary and Italy both cause France. During this period, France faced a budget deficit 
and its attempts to resolve this problem by increasing taxes was negatively accepted (Adam and Deen 2013:1). Italy 
and France are both large, developed G10 countries. A sovereign downgrade in these countries will have a negative 
impact on the business confidence and market sentiment. During this period, Hungary also causes Greece and 
Portugal while Spain causes Hungary and Portugal causes Ireland. Granger results can be seen in Table 6 below. 
Table 6: Granger results for sovereign debt crisis window of contagion 
 Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic P-value  
 HUNGARY does not Granger Cause FRANCE  9.676 *0.001 
 ITALY does not Granger Cause FRANCE  3.563 *0.049 
 HUNGARY does not Granger Cause GREECE  3.412 *0.054 
 HUNGARY does not Granger Cause ITALY  6.354 *0.008 
 HUNGARY does not Granger Cause 
PORTUGAL  4.467 *0.026 
 SPAIN does not Granger Cause HUNGARY  4.693 *0.022 
 PORTUGAL does not Granger Cause 
IRELAND  7.125 *0.005 
* Reject Null Hypothesis at 95% level 
Source: Eviews estimates 
 
Both cointegration and Granger results indicate that there is materially more correlation in the contagion 
windows than in the tranquil windows. This supports the theory that contagion exists when “co-movement exceeds 
that explained by the fundamentals” (Gentile and Giordano 2012:8). Second, the degree of contagion during the 
sovereign debt crisis exceeds that of the Lehman contagion window. Third, when comparing short- and long-run 
relations, it is noteworthy that more long-run relations exist per period than short-run relations. This is 
understandable since sovereign ratings are designed by rating agencies to capture a longer term state. This contrasts 
with the outcomes in the Gentile and Giordano (2012:4) study, which uses bond spreads and equity prices. Bond 
spreads and equity prices are shorter-term and more responsive measures.  
4.3. Country shock results using variance decomposition  
The third step in our estimation procedure involves variance decomposition. Variance decomposition is applied 
to each window of time to indicate how much each of the country sovereign ratings accounts for forecast variance 
over time. Contagion exists where the degree of variance increases over time and the system’s vulnerability to 
shocks increases (Gentile and Giordano 2012:31[4]). An increase in variance points to an externality of an event 
where the co-movement is attributed to something more than fundamentals. All variables were Cholesky ordered for 
each window according to the degree of exogeneity.  The variance decomposition tables are available on request.  
The table 7 to 9 only represents the variance decompositions for Greece as an example. 
Looking at the results, we see in the tranquil window (Table 7) the VDs indicate that each country contributes a 
much higher degree of variance to itself during the tranquil window. Most countries begin in period one to explain 
more than 95 percent of its own forecast variance and this reduces to around 65 percent after 10 periods. This 




225 Leila Fourie and Ilse Botha /  Procedia Economics and Finance  24 ( 2015 )  218 – 227 
Table 7: Variance decomposition - Tranquil window: May 2004 – August 2008  
Variance Decomposition of GREECE: 
Period S.E. GREECE ITALY POLAND PORTUGAL SPAIN HUNGARY 
1 0.127 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5 0.236 77.390 17.033 3.324 0.002 0.000 2.250 
10 0.308 58.861 31.383 7.518 0.117 0.000 2.122 
Source:  Eviews estimates 
 
The Lehman contagion window shown in Table 8 highlights a high degree of connectivity with France entering 
the system more prominently. The forecast variance of France is explained by 32 percent of Hungary in the fifth 
period. France is explained by 11 percent of Hungary in period 10 and by 31 percent of the Spanish variance after 10 
periods. Greece plays a principal role and its forecast variance is explained by 41 percent of Portugal in period two. 
Greece is also explained by 39 percent of Ireland and 11 percent of Spain during period 10. France has an almost 
immediate impact on Greece, causing 24 percent of its variance over the first period before tapering off.  
During this period, Italy’s forecast variance is explained by 55 percent of France in period five and 18 percent of 
Hungary and Italy respectively. Spain explains 40 percent of the forecast variance of Italy in period 10. The 
prominent role that France plays in Italy’s forecast variance continues for Portugal and Spain. France explains 26 
percent of Portugal and over 50 percent of Spain. This can be attributed to the high degree of financial integration 
between these countries. Many French banks were heavily invested in Italian, Spanish and Portuguese sovereign 
debt.  
Table 8 Contagion window: September 2008 – December 2009 
Variance Decomposition of GREECE: 
Period S.E. FRANCE GREECE HUNGARY IRELAND ITALY PORTUGAL SPAIN 
1 1.085 23.779 76.221 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5 1.920 9.869 31.472 5.254 0.815 0.790 40.750 11.050 
10 2.731 5.149 15.597 5.206 39.274 0.728 22.810 11.237 
Source:  Eviews estimates 
 
The sovereign debt window in Table 9 indicates a strong Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain (PIGS) theme. The results 
indicate that the forecast variance of Greece is explained by itself and from the fifth period, 35 percent is explained 
by Portugal’s variance and up to 20 percent by Spain. Once again, Ireland is explained by itself, perhaps indicating 
that most European countries and financial institutions had reduced its exposure to Ireland after the Irish bailout in 
the previous window. Italy’s variance is explained by up to 22 percent of Greece in period five and 14 percent of 
Hungary. Spain’s forecast variance is explained by up to 46 percent of Italy and 10 percent of Greece.  During 
period 10, Spain explains 32 percent of Italy’s forecast variance. This circular and mutually reinforcing pattern 
supports the theory that unifying, externalised factors are at play, all working together to increase the contagion 
experienced by the PIGS countries.  
Table 9: Contagion window: December 2010 – January 2013 
Variance Decomposition of GREECE: 
Period S.E. GREECE HUNGARY IRELAND ITALY PORTUGAL SPAIN 
1 1.097 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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5 1.886 44.294 2.976 1.001 1.326 34.063 16.340 
10 2.748 21.398 3.703 34.605 1.252 18.954 20.088 
Source: Eviews estimates 
5. Conclusion  
The empirical model used a three-step process involving cointegration, Granger causality and variance 
decomposition tests. The main concept that the tests aimed to prove was that contagion existed in the sovereign 
ratings during the two recent windows of contagion, namely the Lehman and sovereign debt crisis. The results gave 
conclusive evidence of contagion during the two crisis windows when compared with the previous tranquil window. 
The tranquil window indicated four cointegrating relations, as compared to the seven and twelve relations during the 
Lehman- and sovereign debt crisis periods. This strongly supported the theory that an abnormally high presence of 
long-run relations exists in the windows of contagion when compared to the tranquil period. These results were 
validated by the Granger causality tests. Granger results indicated the short-run relations between the euro countries. 
Once again, many more short-run relations were evidenced during the contagion windows than during the tranquil 
period. The tranquil window identified only four short-run relations where the contagion windows measured five 
and seven short run relations respectively. The third and final procedure using variance decomposition further 
confirmed the findings from the first two tests. The variance decomposition tests were applied to each window of 
time to indicate how much each of the country sovereign ratings accounts for variance over time. Contagion existed 
where the degree of variance increased over time and the system’s vulnerability to shocks increased. The variance 
decomposition results strongly corroborate the findings from the previous two tests, indicating that contagion was 
present during the Lehman crisis and the sovereign debt crisis period. Test results indicated a higher vulnerability to 
shocks and a higher degree of connection during the windows of contagion than during the tranquil periods. Notable 
was that the sovereign debt crisis experienced a more pronounced degree of contagion than the Lehman crisis period 
did. During the sovereign-debt crisis window, a dominant theme was the highly integrated connection between the 
PIGS countries. The dominant PIGS theme in the sovereign debt window corroborates the idea that the movement in 
these countries goes beyond an isolated cause and effect relationship. These results indicate that a dynamic 
relationship is at play, which is caused by something more than the fundamentals. This gives a strong indication that 
shocks have been externalised during this period.  
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